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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case arises out of a tragic car accident that injured 
Michael Sauers and killed his wife.  The crash resulted from 
the criminally reckless driving of police officer Stephen 
Homanko.  Sauers later brought this suit against Homanko 
and others pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for, 
among other things, violating his and his wife’s Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process rights.  Homanko moved 
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to dismiss the § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim and, in 
the alternative, he sought qualified immunity.  The District 
Court denied the motion and Homanko appealed.  Because 
we conclude that it was not clearly established at the time of 
the crash that Homanko’s conduct, as alleged in the 
complaint, could give rise to constitutional liability under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, we will vacate the District Court’s 
denial of qualified immunity.  We hope, however, to establish 
the law clearly now. 
 
I. Background1 
 
On May 12, 2014, Sauers and his wife were driving 
southbound on Route 209 in the Borough of Nesquehoning, 
Pennsylvania.  At the same time, Homanko was on patrol on 
Route 209 and traveling in the same direction when he 
observed the driver of a yellow Dodge Neon commit a 
summary traffic offense in the northbound lane.  Based on 
that observation alone, he turned around and began to pursue 
the Dodge.  At some point he took the time to radio ahead to 
the police in the neighboring borough to request that officers 
there pull the Dodge over when it reached their jurisdiction.2   
                                              
 1  When reviewing an appeal from a district court’s 
ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept allegations in the 
complaint as true and draw all plausible inferences from those 
allegations in favor of the plaintiff.  Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 
F.3d 424, 432, 434 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 
2  When the car arrived in the neighboring jurisdiction, 
the officers stopped it as requested but did not charge the 
driver with a traffic violation or any other crime.   
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Homanko then decided that catching the Dodge 
himself was important enough to warrant a chase at speeds of 
over 100 miles-per-hour.  Several members of the public 
observed him driving recklessly.  During the pursuit, 
Homanko lost control of his police car while going around a 
curve.  His car began to spin, crossed the center line into 
southbound traffic, and crashed into Sauers’s car.  The 
accident seriously injured Sauers and killed his wife.  
Homanko was subsequently charged and pled guilty to 
vehicular homicide, which requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of reckless or grossly negligent driving, and 
reckless endangerment.3   
 
 The criminal case was not the end of Homanko’s legal 
trouble.  Sauers – individually and as the administrator of his 
wife’s estate – initiated the present lawsuit against him, 
setting forth federal and state law causes of action, including 
a claim under § 1983.4  Sauers premised his § 1983 claim on 
a “state-created danger” theory of liability.  Homanko moved 
                                              
 3  As recounted in his briefing, Homanko additionally 
pled guilty to a number of minor traffic offenses.   
 
 4  Sauers also sued the Borough of Nesquehoning and 
the Nesquehoning Police Chief.  Those parties filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint, separately from Homanko.  The 
District Court granted the motion as to the police chief and 
granted it in part and denied it in part as to the Borough.  
Those rulings have not been appealed.  Accordingly, this 
appeal addresses only the District Court’s denial of 
Homanko’s request for qualified immunity.   
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to dismiss only that claim.  He argued that the complaint did 
not plausibly allege a state-created danger claim and, in the 
alternative, that he was entitled to qualified immunity because 
it was not clearly established in May 2014 that negligent or 
reckless police driving could give rise to a constitutional 
cause of action.  The District Court denied Homanko’s 
motion as to both liability and qualified immunity. 
 
 As to liability, the Court determined that the complaint 
adequately pled a state-created danger claim, a determination 
that Homanko does not now appeal.  The Court further 
concluded that the law was clearly established in May 2014 
that “any reasonable officer would have known that pursuing 
a potential traffic offender in excess of 100 miles-per-hour 
under the[] circumstances [alleged in the complaint] gives 
rise to a state-created danger claim.”  (App. at 21.)  That 
determination is the subject of this appeal.     
 
II. Discussion5 
 
Qualified immunity protects government officials from 
civil damages for conduct that “does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation omitted).  Thus, courts 
                                              
 5  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 over interlocutory appeals raising a purely 
legal challenge to a denial of qualified immunity.  Mirabella 
v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 2017).  Because this 
appeal raises only a question of law, we have jurisdiction and 
our review is plenary.  Id. 
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assessing a claim of qualified immunity must answer two 
questions.  One is whether the defendant’s conduct violated a 
statutory or constitutional right.  The other is whether the 
right at issue was clearly established when the conduct took 
place.  We have discretion to address either inquiry first.  Id. 
at 236. 
 
In its recent decisions addressing qualified immunity, 
the Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts … not to 
define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”  
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (citation 
omitted).  The question in this case therefore cannot be 
framed simply in terms of recklessness generally.  
Homanko’s request for qualified immunity must be assessed 
within the context of the case law that has developed from 
accidents caused by high-speed police pursuits that injure 
third parties. 
 
 A. Sauers’s Complaint Pleads a Plausible State- 
  Created Danger Claim. 
  
 Homanko has not appealed the District Court’s 
determination that the complaint adequately describes a 
constitutional violation, and for good reason.  The pleadings 
describe a police officer driving at speeds over 100 miles-per-
hour on a two-way, undivided road to catch someone who had 
committed a minor traffic infraction.  There was no 
emergency at all, and Homanko likely did the most that was 
warranted when he radioed the police in a neighboring 
jurisdiction to stop the offender.  His hyper-aggressive 
decision to chase the Dodge cannot be justified.  Nonetheless, 
to determine whether his conduct violated a clearly 
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established constitutional right, we must take the time to 
define that right and explain why the conduct violated it. 
 
 Defining a right at the appropriate level of specificity 
is often the most critical aspect of a qualified immunity 
analysis.  In undertaking that task, we are guided by the 
Supreme Court’s repeated instructions to do so in light of the 
particular facts of the case at hand.  See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 
1152; White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017); Mullenix v. 
Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015).  We accordingly define the 
right at issue here as one not to be injured or killed as a result 
of a police officer’s reckless pursuit of an individual 
suspected of a summary traffic offense when there is no 
pending emergency and when the suspect is not actively 
fleeing the police. 
 
 As earlier noted, Sauers’s complaint relies on the state-
created danger theory of liability to establish his right to be 
free from what Homanko did.  That doctrine embodies the 
principle that the government has an obligation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “to protect 
individuals against dangers that the government itself 
creates.”  Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 
2018).  Establishing a claim under that doctrine requires a 
plaintiff to plead four elements: 
 
(1) [t]he harm ultimately caused was 
foreseeable and fairly direct; 
(2) a state actor acted with a degree of 
culpability that shocks the conscience; 
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(3) a relationship between the state and the 
plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a 
foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a 
member of a discrete class of persons subjected 
to the potential harm brought about by the 
state’s actions, as opposed to a member of the 
public in general; and 
(4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her 
authority in a way that created a danger to the 
citizen or that rendered the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted 
at all. 
Id. at 176-77 (citation omitted).  It is clear, we think, that the 
complaint adequately alleges elements one, three, and four.  
Whether Homanko’s alleged conduct shocks the conscience is 
a closer call. 
 
 The level of culpability required “to shock the 
contemporary conscience” falls along a spectrum dictated by 
the circumstances of each case.  County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847-49 & n.8 (1998).  Our case law 
establishes three distinct categories of culpability depending 
on how much time a police officer has to make a decision.  
Haberle, 885 F.3d at 177.  In one category are actions taken 
in a “hyperpressurized environment[.]”  Id. (citation omitted).  
They will not be held to shock the conscience unless the 
officer has “an intent to cause harm.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Next are actions taken within a time frame that allows an 
officer to engage in “hurried deliberation.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  When those actions “reveal a conscious disregard 
of a great risk of serious harm” they will be sufficient to 
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shock the conscience.6  Id. (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Finally, actions undertaken with “unhurried 
judgments,” with time for “careful deliberation,” will be held 
to shock the conscience if they are “done with deliberate 
indifference.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Our case law is clear 
that this “shocks the conscience” framework for analysis 
applies to police-pursuit cases.  Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Health 
& Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 480 
(3d Cir. 2003); cf. Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 432, 448 
(3d Cir. 2017) (relying on pre-2014 case law to conclude that 
the state-created danger doctrine was a clearly established 
theory of liability in September 2014). 
 
 The District Court rightly interpreted the complaint to 
allege that Homanko “had at least some time to deliberate” 
before deciding whether and how to pursue the traffic 
offender.  (App. at 16.)  That places the fact-pattern in the 
second category of culpability, requiring inferences or 
allegations of a conscious disregard of a great risk of serious 
harm.  That conclusion is supported by the allegation that 
                                              
 6  The District Court identified “gross negligence or 
arbitrariness” as the level of culpability required to shock the 
conscience when an officer has time only for hurried 
deliberation.  (App. at 11-12.)  We have described the “gross 
negligence or arbitrariness” standard, however, as one “that 
provides little guidance.”  Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 310 
(3d Cir. 2006).  We have been clear in recent years that the 
level of culpability required to shock the conscience when an 
officer has time for hurried deliberation is “a conscious 
disregard of ‘a great risk of serious harm[.]’”  Haberle, 885 
F.3d at 177 (quoting Sanford, 456 F.3d at 310); accord 
Kedra, 876 F.3d at 437. 
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Homanko, at some point, had time to call the neighboring 
police department as he was contemplating his actions.  It is 
further supported by an obvious inference from the nature of 
the Dodge driver’s mild provocation:  there was no 
emergency arising from a simple traffic violation.  The 
liability question thus becomes whether deciding to pursue a 
potential summary traffic offender at speeds of over 100 
miles-per-hour, after radioing for assistance from the 
neighboring jurisdiction where the potential offender was 
headed, demonstrates a conscious disregard of a great risk of 
serious harm.  We have no difficulty in concluding that it 
does. 
 
 Engaging in a high-speed pursuit on public roadways 
at speeds of over 100 miles-per-hour threatens “all those 
within … range [of the pursuit], be they suspects, their 
passengers, other drivers, or bystanders.”  Lewis, 523 U.S. at 
853.  Every police officer understands that risk.  That is why 
we expect our law enforcement personnel to engage in such 
pursuits only when “reasonable justification” exists.  Id. at 
846.  Responding to a true emergency may be a reasonable 
justification.  Pursuing an actively fleeing suspect who is 
endangering the public welfare may also be a reasonable 
justification.  But attempting to catch someone who has 
committed a minor traffic offense, especially when other law 
enforcement officials have been alerted to stop the offender, 
is not a reasonable justification for driving “careless[ly]” and 
at “speed[s] in excess of 100 mph.”  (App. at 31-32.)  
Homanko did not have to make a split-second decision “in 
haste” and “under pressure.”  Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853 (citation 
omitted).  He could have let the officers in the neighboring 
jurisdiction handle the routine traffic stop as, in fact, they did.  
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Instead, he chose to engage in a reckless and unjustifiable 
pursuit, with tragic consequences. 
 
 In sum, Sauers adequately pled that Homanko’s 
conduct was conscience-shocking under our state-created 
danger framework.  The complaint therefore contains a 
plausible claim that Homanko violated Sauers’s and his 
wife’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. 
 
 B. The Right at Issue Was Not Clearly   
  Established In May 2014. 
 
The existence of a substantive due process claim 
having been established, we now turn to the central issue of 
this appeal, namely whether Homanko had fair warning that 
he could be subject to constitutional liability for actions taken 
in conscious disregard of a great risk of harm during the 
course of a police pursuit.  We conclude that he did not.  At 
the time of the crash in May 2014, the state of the law was 
such that police officers may have understood they could be 
exposed to constitutional liability for actions taken during a 
police pursuit only when they had an intent to harm.  Thus, it 
was not at that time clearly established that Homanko’s 
actions could violate the substantive due process rights of 
Sauers and his wife. 
 
A right is clearly established when the law is 
“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.”  Reichle 
v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (internal quotation 
marks, citation, and alteration omitted).  That does not require 
a prior precedent with indistinguishable facts, “but existing 
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 
12 
 
question beyond debate.”  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 
741 (2011).  Existing precedent is sufficient to place a 
constitutional question beyond debate and to defeat qualified 
immunity only if it is “controlling authority in [the relevant] 
jurisdiction,” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999), or if 
“a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ in the 
Court of Appeals” has settled the question, Mammaro v. N.J. 
Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quoting Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 
(2015)). 
 
When qualified immunity is at issue, context matters.  
The “inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific 
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’”  
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 
U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam)).  When courts fail to take 
into consideration the “particularized” facts of a case, they 
permit plaintiffs “to convert the rule of qualified immunity … 
into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging 
violation of extremely abstract rights.”  White, 137 S. Ct. at 
552 (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987)). 
 
 There is, moreover, an important distinction between 
assessing whether a plaintiff has pled a “clearly established 
theory of liability” and the question of whether that theory is 
fairly applied to a government official in light of the facts in a 
given case.  See Kedra, 876 F.3d at 435 (explaining that a 
particular right is only clearly established when the state of 
the law gave the relevant official “fair warning that his 
actions were unconstitutional in the particular factual scenario 
he confronted” (internal quotation marks, citation, and 
editorial marks omitted)).  It is only when both the theory of 
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liability and its application to the established facts are 
sufficiently plain that the legal question of liability is beyond 
legitimate debate and a plaintiff can defeat a qualified 
immunity defense.  Id. at 435-36.  In this instance, as 
discussed above, Sauers’s complaint relies on the clearly 
established state-created danger theory of liability.  The 
particular factual allegations, meanwhile, involve a police 
pursuit of a non-fleeing summary traffic offender. 
 
 Accordingly, to assess whether the right to be free of 
the risk associated with a non-emergency but reckless police 
pursuit was clearly established in May 2014, we must ask 
whether Supreme Court precedent, our own precedent, or a 
consensus of authority among the courts of appeals placed 
that right beyond debate.  See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741-42; 
Kedra, 876 F.3d at 450.  Qualified immunity, after all, 
protects even those officials who exercise extraordinarily 
poor judgment.  al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743.  Law enforcement 
officials do not get stripped of qualified immunity every time 
a judge, with the clarity afforded by hindsight, believes that 
an official has committed a wrong.  Otherwise, the very 
purpose of qualified immunity – to give law enforcement 
officials the benefit of all reasonable doubt in the exercise of 
their professional duties – would be undermined.  If any 
uncertainty existed in the law in May 2014 as to whether 
reckless police driving could give rise to constitutional 
liability in circumstances such as those alleged here, then we 
must afford Homanko the protections of qualified immunity.  
Our survey of the relevant cases reveals that the law was not 
so clear as to be “beyond debate.”  Id. at 741. 
 
 An officer on patrol in May 2014 could have 
reasonably understood, based on prevailing law, that he could 
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pursue a potential traffic offender, even recklessly, without 
being subjected to constitutional liability.  The Supreme 
Court, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 
(1998), had adopted an intent-to-harm standard in a police 
pursuit case involving a high-speed chase of dangerously 
fleeing suspects.  Id. at 854.  In the years between that 
decision and the events at issue here, the courts of appeals 
were inconsistent in whether to apply the intent-to-harm 
standard in police-pursuit cases only when an exigency 
necessitated a chase, or whether to apply that standard in all 
police-pursuit cases, regardless of any exigencies. 
 
 Lewis involved a police officer who was pursuing two 
suspects actively fleeing the police in a dangerous manner.  
Id. at 836.  The suspects, riding together on a motorcycle, 
were weaving in and out of traffic at high speeds.  Id.  After 
the driver of the motorcycle lost control and crashed, the 
pursuing officer accidentally struck and killed one of the 
suspects.  Id. at 837.  The Court characterized the situation as 
involving an officer who had to make an “instantaneous” 
reaction to the fleeing suspects’ “outrageous behavior[.]”  Id. 
at 855.  It held that, in such circumstances, a police pursuit 
will not give rise to a substantive due process violation absent 
a specific intent to harm.  Id. at 854.  In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court noted that conduct intended to cause 
harm was “most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking 
level” and that negligent conduct was never sufficient for a 
substantive due process claim.  Id. at 849.  It also explained, 
however, that conduct falling between intentional conduct 
and negligent conduct was “a matter for closer calls” that 
could, given the right circumstances, be actionable under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. 
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 Lewis, then, clearly established that an officer can be 
liable for a substantive due process violation resulting from a 
high-speed pursuit of a dangerously fleeing suspect only if the 
officer intended to cause harm.  But it left open the possibility 
that a lower level of culpability could suffice in the right 
circumstances.  In May 2014, the courts of appeals had not 
coalesced around what those circumstances might be in the 
police-pursuit context.  The Tenth Circuit, in Green v. Post, 
addressed a police officer’s request for qualified immunity in 
a case analogous to ours and explained that 
 
there are many permutations on the theme of 
police pursuits; while most involve high speeds, 
there are many variables, including whether the 
officer is responding to an emergency or not, 
whether he or she is directly pursuing a fleeing 
suspect or not, and, significantly under Lewis 
and cases interpreting it, whether the officer has 
time for actual deliberation. 
574 F.3d 1294, 1309 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 
 In Green, an innocent driver was killed after a police 
officer crashed into the victim’s car as the officer “was 
simply trying to catch up to [a] suspected violator of the 
law[.]”  Id. at 1297.  The suspect had allegedly filled his car 
up with approximately $30 worth of gas without paying for it.  
Id. at 1296.  The crash occurred as the officer “was traveling 
straight through [an] intersection at a high rate of speed and 
without his vehicle’s siren or lights on[.]”  Id.  The officer 
admitted “that he was not responding to an emergency 
situation” and that the suspect was not actively fleeing him.  
Id. at 1297. 
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 The court identified the officer’s actions as falling “in 
the middle range of the culpability spectrum” identified by 
Lewis – more than negligent but not quite intentional – that 
could potentially give rise to a substantive due process 
violation.  Id. at 1302 (citation omitted).  It thus applied the 
“deliberate indifference” standard when assessing the 
officer’s conduct.  Id. at 1302-03.  Although it concluded that 
the conduct was not sufficiently conscience-shocking to 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the court nonetheless 
proceeded to analyze whether the law on police pursuits was 
clearly established.  Id. at 1303-04. 
 
 It noted that at least two of our sister circuits – the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits – have adopted an “intent to harm” 
standard for all police pursuit cases, whether or not an 
emergency existed at the time of pursuit.  Id. at 1308-09 
(citing Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 
2008); Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(en banc)).  The Ninth Circuit, for its part, held “that the 
Lewis standard of ‘intent to harm’ applies to all high-speed 
police chases,” and it refused to “draw a distinction between 
‘emergency’ and ‘non-emergency’ situations” involving an 
officer’s attempt to apprehend a suspect.7  Bingue, 512 F.3d at 
                                              
 7  Although the Ninth Circuit appears to have limited 
its application of Lewis’s intent-to-harm standard to 
“situations involving high-speed chases aimed at 
apprehending a fleeing suspect,” any such limitation does not 
undermine that court’s explicit refusal to distinguish between 
“‘emergency’ and ‘non-emergency’ situations.”  Bingue, 512 
F.3d at 1177.  It also leaves open the question of whether a 
suspect leaving the scene of a crime, who does not know that 
17 
 
1177.  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit interpreted Lewis as 
meaning “that the intent-to-harm standard, rather than the 
deliberate indifference standard, applies to all high-speed 
police pursuits aimed at apprehending suspected offenders.”  
Helseth, 258 F.3d at 871.  After surveying the state of the law 
after Lewis, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “it was not 
clearly established [in June 2006] what specific standard [of 
culpability] applied to … [an] officer … engaged in a high-
speed non-emergency response to a call to locate and arrest a 
suspected gas thief.”  Id. at 1304. 
 
 The Eighth Circuit has since reemphasized its 
interpretation of Lewis.  In Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, it 
was faced with circumstances in which a police officer  
responded to a 911 report of a robbery in a Wal-Mart parking 
lot involving $55 and an alleged assault.  606 F.3d 461, 464 
(8th Cir. 2010).  Despite the fact that the crime was not 
reported to be ongoing, and that other officers were already 
en route to the scene, the defendant-officer decided to drive 
between 80 and 90 miles-per-hour on a 30 mile-per-hour two-
way street without turning on his sirens or emergency lights.  
Id.  In racing to the parking lot, the officer crossed over into 
opposing traffic, ultimately crashing into a bystander’s car at 
an intersection and killing one of the occupants.  Id.  The 
court nevertheless upheld the application of an intent-to-harm 
standard because the defendant-officer had testified that he 
“subjectively” believed that he was responding to an 
emergency.  Id. at 468.  The court explained that that standard 
                                                                                                     
the police are pursuing him, should be considered a “fleeing 
suspect.”  It is far from certain, therefore, what standard of 
culpability the Ninth Circuit would apply to the facts at issue 
here. 
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was appropriate even though the facts “might not qualify as 
an ‘emergency’ under” police department policies.  Id.  And, 
importantly, it held that it did “not ‘reject intent-to-harm as 
the governing standard whenever a judge or a jury could say, 
with the wisdom of hindsight, that an officer engaged in a 
high-speed pursuit had ample time to deliberate.’”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  According to that court, “the amount of 
time [an officer has] to deliberate on his actions is not, by 
itself, sufficient to render the intent-to-harm standard 
inapplicable.”  Id. 
 
 Given those decisions by the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits, we cannot conclude that case law by May of 2014 
had clearly established that an officer’s decision to engage in 
a high speed pursuit of a suspected traffic offender could, in 
the absence of an intent to harm, give rise to constitutional 
liability.8  A police officer could have understood that, as 
                                              
 8  Our own precedents do not provide any added clarity 
regarding the proper standard by which to judge whether an 
officer’s conduct shocks the conscience in police pursuits that 
involve neither an emergency nor a fleeing suspect.  Although 
we have indicated that the “shocks the conscience” standard 
applies to police pursuit cases, see Brown, 318 F.3d at 480 
(“[T]he ‘shocks the conscience’ standard should apply in all 
substantive due process cases if the state actor had to act with 
urgency[, including] police pursuit cases[.]”), our cases do not 
give fair warning that, absent an intent to harm, police could 
face constitutional liability based on a high-speed pursuit, see, 
e.g., Davis v. Twp. of Hillside, 190 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 
1999) (applying Lewis intent to harm standard to injury of 
bystander who was injured as a result of a high-speed pursuit 
of a fleeing suspect). 
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long as he believed a pursuit was justified, constitutional 
liability would not follow based on recklessness alone. 
 
 Our dissenting colleague disagrees, concluding that it 
was obvious in May 2014 that Homanko’s conduct violated 
the Constitution.  Concur./Dissent at 9-10.  To the dissent, it 
is of high importance that the Tenth Circuit in Green applied 
a deliberate difference standard to a police driving case that, 
as here, involved neither an emergency nor an actively fleeing 
suspect.  But the dissent discounts the fact that no court of 
appeals (until now) has joined the Tenth Circuit in 
distinguishing between those police pursuit cases in which a 
true exigency exists and those in which less is at stake.  As 
we have described above, at least two courts of appeals have 
explicitly questioned the sort of distinction drawn by the 
Tenth Circuit.9   
 
We agree with the Tenth Circuit’s application of a 
culpability standard below that of “intent to harm” in a non-
emergency police pursuit case – indeed the entire panel here 
is in accord on that point.  Where we part company with our 
dissenting colleague is at his rejection of the rest of the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision.  That court acknowledged that the law was 
not yet clearly established.  We accept the accuracy of that 
assessment then and believe the law as of May 2014 still 
                                                                                                     
 
 9  The dissent minimizes the import of Bingue and 
Helseth because those cases involved conduct differing from 
the conduct alleged here.  But those differences do not alter 
those courts’ explicit holdings that the intent-to-harm 
standard should apply to police pursuits whether or not the 
officer is responding to a pending emergency. 
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remained unsettled; our dissenting colleague disagrees.  
While he evidently views the legal conclusion about 
constitutional liability as obvious, we do not.  Nor can we say 
that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Green alone amounts to 
the “‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ in the 
Court of Appeals” that we have held necessary to clearly 
establish a right in the absence of controlling precedent.  
Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 169 (quoting Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 
2044).  That is especially so in light of the Eighth Circuit’s 
post-Green decision in Sitzes. 
 
 The dissent also suggests that Homanko’s guilty plea 
to vehicular homicide and reckless endangerment supports the 
conclusion that he violated a clearly established constitutional 
right.  Concur./Dissent  at 10 n.3.  Assuming that a guilty plea 
to a state criminal statute is important in deciding whether the 
culpable conduct violated a clearly established right 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, see Kane v. 
Barger, No. 17-3027, --- F.3d ---, 2018 WL 4000068, at *7 
(3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2018) (suggesting, though not holding, that 
conduct meeting a state criminal statute is more likely to 
violate a clearly established constitutional right),10 a 
                                              
 10  We note that Kane’s ultimate rejection of qualified 
immunity rested on the fact that our own precedent contained 
factually and legally analogous case law to put the defendant 
“on notice that he acted unconstitutionally.”  Kane, 2018 WL 
4000068, at *7.  No such case law existed in our Circuit in 
May 2014 that would have given Homanko fair warning that 
he could be subject to constitutional liability for actions 
during a police pursuit that were not taken with an intent to 
harm. 
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conviction for reckless behavior does not help answer the 
issue in this appeal:  namely, was the law settled in May 2014 
that, absent a specific intent to harm, constitutional liability 
could be imposed on a police officer engaged in a police 
pursuit.  We think it was not, and the sympathy we have for 
the victims of Officer Homanko’s serious error does not 
change that. 
 
 Consequently, although Homanko’s judgment was bad 
to the point of recklessness, he is entitled to qualified 
immunity on Sauers’s § 1983 state-created danger claim.11 
 
 C. Establishing the Law in the Third Circuit. 
 
 Although the state of the law in May 2014 was 
unsettled as to whether police officers engaged in a police 
pursuit could be subject to constitutional liability for a level 
of culpability less than an intent to harm, our opinion today 
should resolve any ambiguity in that regard within this 
Circuit.  Police officers now have fair warning that their 
conduct when engaged in a high-speed pursuit will be subject 
to the full body of our state-created danger case law.  That 
law clearly establishes that the level of culpability required to 
shock the conscience exists on a spectrum tied to the amount 
of time a government official has to act.  In the police pursuit 
context, it is also necessary to take into consideration the 
                                              
 11  We emphasize that our decision on qualified 
immunity does not mean that Homanko is immune from any 
suit arising from his conduct; he is only immune to a suit 
alleging the federal constitutional claims made here.  He 
remains exposed to state law tort claims that can, and have 
been, brought against him, so Sauers is not without a remedy. 
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officer’s justification for engaging in the pursuit.  We 
recognize that most high-speed police pursuits arise when 
officers are responding to emergencies or when they must 
make split-second decisions to pursue fleeing suspects.  Our 
holding today does nothing to alter the longstanding principle 
that, in such cases, constitutional liability cannot exist absent 
an intent to harm.  But when there is no compelling 
justification for an officer to engage in a high-speed pursuit 
and an officer has time to consider whether to engage in such 
inherently risky behavior, constitutional liability can arise 
when the officer proceeds to operate his vehicle in a manner 
that demonstrates a conscious disregard of a great risk of 
serious harm. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s denial of Homanko’s request for qualified immunity. 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part.  
 I agree with my colleagues that under our state-created 
danger framework, the facts alleged by Appellee Michael 
Sauers readily establish that Officer Homanko’s conduct was 
conscience-shocking.  I also agree that, going forward, 
“[p]olice officers now have fair warning that their conduct 
when engaged in a high-speed pursuit will be subject to the full 
body of our state-created danger case law.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 
15.  I therefore join parts II.A and II.C of the majority’s 
decision in full.  However, because I believe that a reasonable 
officer in Homanko’s position would have known on May 12, 
2014, that the outrageous conduct alleged in this case was 
unconstitutional, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 
finding that Homanko is entitled to qualified immunity.  
I. 
Under the second prong of the qualified immunity 
analysis, we must ask “the objective (albeit fact-specific) 
question whether a reasonable officer could have believed 
[Homanko’s conduct] to be lawful, in light of clearly 
established law and the information [he] possessed.”  Anderson 
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).  In undertaking this 
analysis, the “key issue” is whether a reasonable police officer 
in Homanko’s position could have believed that driving a 
police cruiser at speeds in excess of 100 miles-per-hour to 
catch up to an unsuspecting motorist, who allegedly committed 
a minor traffic infraction, “comported with established legal 
standards” as they existed on the date of the accident.  Beers-
Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citation omitted).  Critically, “it need not be the case that the 
exact conduct has previously been held unlawful so long as the 
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‘contours of the right’ are sufficiently clear such that a ‘general 
constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law’ 
applies with ‘obvious clarity’” to the established facts.  Kedra 
v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 450 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal 
citations omitted) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; Hope v. 
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).  This principle holds true 
“‘even in novel factual circumstances,’ because the relevant 
question is whether the state of the law at the time of the events 
gave the officer ‘fair warning.’”  Id. (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. 
at 741).  
Here, I agree with the majority that, as of May 2014, it 
was “clear” that Homanko’s conduct would be evaluated 
pursuant to our Court’s sliding scale of culpability.1  Maj. Slip 
Op. at 8.  I also agree with the majority that our Court has “been 
clear in recent years that the level of culpability required to 
shock the conscience when an officer has time for hurried 
deliberation is a conscious disregard of a great risk of serious 
harm.”  Id. at 8 n.6 (alterations and citations omitted).  And, 
like the majority, I too “have no difficulty in concluding” that 
an officer who exhibits deplorable judgment and 
“unjustifiabl[y]” pursues “a potential summary traffic offender 
at speeds of over 100 miles-per-hour, after radioing for 
assistance from the neighboring jurisdiction where the 
                                              
1  The Supreme Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
523 U.S. 833 (1998), indicated that a sliding scale of culpable 
conduct applied to determine whether a law enforcement 
officer’s actions were sufficiently conscienceshocking to 
impose liability, stating that the deliberate indifference 
“standard is sensibly employed only when actual deliberation 
is practical.” Id. at 851.  There is no dispute here that “actual 
deliberation” by Homanko was practical.   
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potential offender was headed, demonstrates a conscious 
disregard of a great risk of serious harm.”  Id. at 8-9.  Applying 
these mutually held premises to the question of whether the 
Sauers’ due process rights were clearly established on the date 
in question, it would appear, therefore, that the majority and I 
are in agreement that “the contours of the right are sufficiently 
clear[] such that a general constitutional rule already identified 
in the decisional law applies with obvious clarity” to the 
established facts.  Kedra, 876 F.3d at 450 (internal citations 
omitted).   
Yet despite our conspicuous agreements on the 
pertinent legal principles and their application to the facts at 
hand, the majority has concluded that Homanko is entitled to 
qualified immunity on the ground that the law was not “settled 
in May 2014 that, absent a specific intent to harm, 
constitutional liability could be imposed on a police officer 
engaged in a police pursuit..”  Maj. Slip Op. at 20 (emphasis 
added).  Justification for such a finding eludes me.  To endorse 
the majority’s conclusion, one must accept the proposition that 
on May 12, 2014, a reasonable police officer—fully informed 
of the legal principles recited above—would not have 
considered it conscience-shocking to (1) execute a U-turn into 
oncoming traffic for the sole purpose of catching a potential 
traffic offender, and then (2) proceed in breakneck fashion to 
pursue the unmindful offender at speeds over 100 miles-per-
hour, all while being fully aware that there are officers ahead 
better positioned to execute a stop.   
Our case law does not compel such an implausible 
conclusion.  On the date in question here, a reasonable officer 
undertaking a non-emergency, high-speed pursuit would have 
known that in police pursuit cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, we assess whether an officer’s conduct “shocks the 
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conscience” by gauging how much time the officer had to 
deliberate before deciding to give chase.  Maj. Slip Op. at 8 
(citing, inter alia, Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Health & Emergency 
Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 480 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
Indeed, five years prior to the date in question, the Tenth 
Circuit held in Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294, 1302–03 (10th 
Cir. 2009), that Lewis’s intent-to-harm standard does not apply 
if—as here—an officer is not engaged in a hot pursuit of a 
fleeing suspect, but rather is engaged in a non-emergency, 
high-speed, unilateral pursuit of a suspected offender who is 
unaware that she is being chased.  In such circumstances, the 
officer’s conduct is evaluated under a “middle level [standard] 
of culpability” that looks to whether the officer acted with 
“conscious, deliberate indifference to an extreme risk of very 
serious harm to the plaintiff.”  Id. at 1303.  The “middle level 
standard” applied in Green mirrors the “mid-level standard” 
that we formally adopted in Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 
307 (3d Cir. 2006), and that the majority applied here.  See Maj. 
Slip Op. at 8 n.6. 
In my view, qualified immunity should not be granted 
here simply because there is little case law imposing liability 
on a police officer who drives his cruiser at speeds in excess of 
100 miles per hour in a non-emergency situation.   Neither the 
Supreme Court nor our Court has ever adopted a liability-based 
litmus test for determining whether a right was clearly 
established on the date in question.  See Kedra, 876 F.3d at 450 
(“[I]t need not be the case that the exact conduct has previously 
been held unlawful so long as the ‘contours of the right’ are 
sufficiently clear. . . .”) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640) 
(emphasis added); see also Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 
F.3d 205, 211 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (“If the unlawfulness of the 
defendant’s conduct would have been apparent to a reasonable 
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official based on the current state of the law, it is not necessary 
that there be binding precedent from this circuit so advising.”).  
Instead the touchstone of our analysis is reasonableness: 
“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing 
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open 
legal questions.”  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 
(2011).  And based on the state of the law on May 12, 2014, it 
is readily apparent to me that a reasonable officer would have 
known—based on the general constitutional principles 
delineated in our case law and Green’s pronouncement that 
Lewis does not apply to unilateral, non-emergency pursuits of 
a non-fleeing suspect—that the type of conduct exhibited by 
Officer Homanko was unconstitutional.   
The three cases cited by the majority—two of which 
pre-date Green by several years—do not, in my opinion, alter 
this conclusion.   When seeking guidance from our sister 
courts, “[t]he dispositive question is whether the violative 
nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”  L.R. v. 
Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235, 248 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per 
curiam) (emphasis in original)).  And the particular conduct at 
issue here is not found in either Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 
1169 (9th Cir. 2008), or Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (en banc), as both of those cases centered on conduct 
that took place during the hot pursuit of a “fleeing” suspect and, 
as such, were clearly governed by Lewis.  See Bingue, 512 F.3d 
at 1177 (“We conclude that high-speed police chases, by their 
very nature, do not give the officers involved adequate time to 
deliberate in either deciding to join the chase or how to drive 
while in pursuit of the fleeing suspect.”) (emphasis added); see 
also Helseth, 258 F.3d at 872 (“[The suspect] was a fleeing 
criminal, whose irresponsible high-speed driving endangered 
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countless citizens and ultimately killed one innocent bystander 
and maimed another. . . .”) (emphasis added).   
Nor did Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, 606 F.3d 461 
(8th Cir. 2010), involve the particular conduct at issue here.  
Sitzes involved an accident in February of 2007 when an officer 
responding to a reported robbery and assault drove his vehicle 
at speeds between 80 and 90 m.p.h. and collided in an 
intersection with another car, killing the innocent driver and 
injuring a passenger.  The majority in Sitzes relied upon the 
fact that the officer in question subjectively believed that he 
was responding to an emergency in holding that the “intent to 
harm” standard, and not a “deliberate indifference” or 
“conscious disregard of a great risk of serious harm” standard, 
applied to the officer’s conduct.  Significantly, the majority 
plainly indicated that the “intent to harm” standard would not 
control where the officer did not subjectively believe that the 
situation presented a real emergency, stating: 
Although we are deeply troubled by Officer 
Wright's actions, we cannot say that the district 
court erred in applying the intent-to-harm 
standard in this case. First, we must reject 
plaintiffs' primary argument, which bases liability 
on the situation . . . not being a “true” emergency. 
Terrell forecloses inquiry into the objective 
nature of the emergency, as substantive due 
process liability turns on the intent of the 
government actor. 396 F.3d at 980. Thus, the fact 
that the situation . . . was not as serious as those 
presented in Helseth or Terrell, or that it might not 
qualify as an “emergency” under the [police 
department] Policy and Procedure manual, is not 
determinative of the appropriate level of scrutiny. 
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Neither is the fact, emphasized by the dissent, that 
Officer McDougal and others testified that they 
would never have driven in the manner that 
Officer Wright did, or that Officer McDougal 
responded to the situation . . . differently than 
Officer Wright. This would all be more relevant 
if our question was whether the situation was an 
objectively “true” emergency. However, it bears 
little relevance to the question of what Officer 
Wright subjectively believed. . . .   
We agree with the dissent that our opinion 
should not be read to establish a rule that an 
officer can insulate himself from substantive due 
process liability, no matter the circumstances, by 
simply averring that he subjectively believed the 
situation to which he was responding was an 
emergency. See Terrell, 396 F.3d at 980 n. 2. 
This could lead to the absurd results forecasted 
by the dissent. For example, the dissent fears that 
this case could be used to insulate from 
substantive due process liability an officer who 
drove “100 miles per hour through a children's 
playground during recess time,” or an officer 
who drove “the wrong way down an interstate 
highway ... when responding to something as 
routine as a reported accident requiring traffic 
control[,]” as long as the officer stated that he 
believed the situation to be an emergency. First, 
such cases are far beyond the factual scenarios of 
Lewis, Helseth, and Terrell, which involved 
officers using conventional emergency driving 
techniques to respond to perceived emergencies. 
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Nothing in our opinion would countenance 
granting summary judgment in either of the two 
situations presented by the dissent. Second, we 
think it very likely that an officer who 
intentionally drove through a playground or the 
wrong way on an interstate highway could be 
held liable even under the intent-to-harm 
standard, regardless of the officer's avowed 
belief, at least absent some compelling exigency 
not described in the hypotheticals. In sum, we do 
not understand this case to establish a per se rule 
that an officer's self-serving affidavit will always 
insulate that officer from substantive due process 
liability. Instead, we simply hold that the 
plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine issue of 
fact as to Officer Wright's subjective belief and 
that this belief is not so preposterous as to reflect 
bad faith on the part of Officer Wright. 
Id. at 468, 469-70.  Thus, far from rejecting application of a 
conscious disregard standard to police conduct that did not 
concern an emergency situation, Sitzes actually suggests that 
such a standard does apply when it is clear that the officer was 
not confronted with an emergency situation. And in our case, 
we are in full agreement that “[t]here was no emergency at all, 
and Homanko likely did the most that was warranted when he 
radioed the police in a neighboring jurisdiction to stop the 
offender.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 6.  The reliance in Sitzeson the 
officer’s belief in that case that he faced an emergency situation 
can be read as providing notice to law enforcement officers that 
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they are not insulated from liability for engaging in egregiously 
reckless criminal conduct in a non-emergency context.2 
Green on the other hand—as the majority plainly 
recognized—“arose in a non-emergency setting and did not 
involve a suspect fleeing the police in a dangerous manner.”  
Maj. Slip Op. at 14.  Those facts—again as the majority 
recognized—are akin “to the allegations in this case. . . .”  Id.  
The majority is correct in its assertions that “[w]hen qualified 
immunity it at issue, context matters” and that courts must 
“take into account the ‘particularized’ facts of a case.” Maj. 
Slip Op. at 11. Green, therefore, is the only case that addresses 
the context and particularized conduct at issue here.  And when 
read in conjunction with the “general constitutional rule 
already identified in the decisional law,” it is evident—indeed, 
“obvious”—that a reasonable officer would have known on 
May 12, 2014, that Officer Homanko’s admittedly criminal 
                                              
 
2 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, we do not 
minimize the import of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Bingue 
or the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Helseth. Instead, we rely 
upon the Eighth Circuit’s post-Helseth and post-Bingue careful 
delineation between emergency and non-emergency situations 
articulated in Sitzes..We also rely and on the Tenth Circuit’s 
holding in Green that the intent to harm standard does not 
apply in the non-emergency context to conclude that a 
reasonable police officer would know in May of 2014 that the 
type of conduct engaged in by Homanko was conscience-
shocking such that liability could be imposed.  
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conduct was unconstitutional.3  Kedra, 876 F.3d at 450 
(citation omitted).   
                                              
3 It bears reiterating that Officer Homanko pled guilty to 
vehicular homicide and reckless endangerment.  A reasonable 
officer engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in the loss of 
life and severe personal injuries in a violent collision surely 
would understand that his conduct would be regarded as 
sufficiently conscience-shocking so as to preclude the defense 
of qualified immunity.  Indeed, it would appear that his guilty 
plea would defeat the defense of official immunity under 
Pennsylvania tort law that would otherwise be available to 
Officer Homanko for engaging in conduct that fell within the 
scope of his duties.  See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8550 (application of 
official immunity otherwise available under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 
8446(2) is foreclosed where “it is judicially determined that the 
act of the employee caused the injury and that such act 
constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful 
misconduct.”).  This reinforces the conclusion that a 
reasonable law enforcement officer would understand that he 
could not take another person’s life through criminal conduct 
and yet retain qualified immunity.  Notably, in Kane v. Barger, 
No. 17-3027, --- F.3d ---, 2018 WL 4000068, at *7 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 22, 2018), we held that a law enforcement officer’s 
conduct that merely “resemble[d] the crime of indecent 
assault” – the officer had touched the plaintiff’s intimate parts 
for his own gratification – was such that “given the 
egregiousness of [defendant’s] violation of [plaintiff’s] 
personal security and bodily integrity, the right here is so 
‘obvious’ that it could be deemed clearly established even 
without materially similar cases.”  So, too, here the 
obviousness of Officer Homanko’s violation of the plaintiffs’ 
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Our decision in Kedra supports this conclusion.  There, 
the mother of a Pennsylvania State Trooper brought a § 1983 
claim against a police instructor who accidentally shot a loaded 
handgun into the trooper’s chest during a routine training 
session, killing him.  Kedra, 876 F.3d at 432.  The complaint 
alleged that the officer’s conduct was conscience shocking 
because he “bypassed all of the safety checks [and] failed to 
physically or visually inspect the gun to ensure it was 
unloaded” before pulling the trigger.  Id. at 433.  Like the 
majority here, we concluded in Kedra that the allegations gave 
rise to the inference that the officer “acted with actual 
knowledge of a substantial risk of lethal harm” so as to shock 
the conscience under a then-clearly established theory of 
deliberate indifference.  Id. at 448 (citations omitted).  We then 
turned to the question of whether the right at issue—i.e., “an 
individual’s right not to be subjected, defenseless, to a police 
officer’s demonstration of the use of deadly force in a manner 
contrary to all applicable safety protocols”—was clearly 
established on the date in question.  Id. at 449 (footnote 
omitted).  After reciting the general constitutional rules 
identified in our decisional law and analyzing the facts of a 
“closely analogous case from the First Circuit,” we concluded 
that a reasonable officer would have had fair warning that the 
conduct at issue was constitutionally prohibited on the date in 
question.  Id. at 450–52 (citation omitted).   
The same conclusion applies here.  The general 
constitutional principles are clear.  Green applied those 
principles to an analogous set of facts.  The unconstitutional 
                                              
rights to life and bodily integrity defeats the defense of 
qualified immunity even in the absence of materially similar 
cases. 
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nature of Homanko’s actions, placing at substantial risk those 
traveling a two-lane, undivided highway in recklessly criminal 
pursuit of an unsuspecting motorist for a minor traffic 
infraction, was clearly established when he slammed into the 
Sauers’ vehicle, mortally injuring Mrs. Sauer and severely 
injuring her husband.   
I respectfully dissent.   
